Johnny Pagal y La Varias vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 251894, March 2, 2022

 

Johnny Pagal y La Varias vs. People of the Philippines, 

G.R. No. 251894, March 2, 2022

 

Facts:

1.     On October 14, 2016, Executive Judge Parayno issued Search Warrant No. 33-2016-L. On October 17, 2016, the team implementing the search warrant conducted a briefing at the Lingayen Police Station.

2.     Later, the team arrived at Pagal's house. PO3 Naungayan showed him the Search Warrant and explained its contents to him. 

3.     Upon Kagawad Manuel's arrival, the search of the house commenced. 

4.     In the living room, PO1 Saringan found atop the television a Marlboro cigarette pack containing four small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with white crystalline substances. 

5.     As the search was ongoing, Police Officer 1 Oliver Sinaban contacted Emil Toledo of Northwest Sun News and a representative from the Department of Justice. Only Toledo arrived.

6.     POl Saringan then marked the items seized in the presence of Pagal, Kagawad Manuel, and Toledo. Still in the presence of the witnesses, POl Saringan proceeded to conduct the inventory. Pagal was then brought to the police station.

 

Issues:

·      Whether or not the search warrant is valid

·      Whether or not there is illegal possession of dangerous drugs

·      Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs

 

Ruling:

 

Petitioner is acquitted.

 

FIRST ISSUE

 

Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 33-2016-L because allegedly, there was no evidence that the executive judge who issued the warrant examined the applicant. The Supreme Court is not convinced. Petitioner raised this for the first time before this Court, so he is deemed to have waived his objection when he failed to raise it before the trial court.

 

SECOND ISSUE

 

Conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs requires that the following be established: "(l) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug." Possession contemplates actual and constructive possession

 

The Court of Appeals correctly stated that all the elements are present. The confiscated drugs were found inside petitioner's house, as specified in the Search Warrant. Absent evidence to the contrary, mere finding of illicit drugs in petitioner's house raises the presumption of constructive possession. Here, apart from alleging non-exclusive possession of the house, Pagal merely denied having smoked Marlboro cigarettes. Pagal also failed to present any authority to possess the illegal drugs confiscated from his house. His only defenses were denial and frame-up. Without clear and persuasive proof, these are inherently weak and deserve no credence.

 

THIRD ISSUE

 

Aside from establishing the elements of illegal possession, the prosecution must prove that the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti have been preserved and established beyond reasonable doubt. The existence of dangerous drugs as the corpus delicti of the crime is a condition sine qua non for a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165.

 

Republic Act No. 10640 amended the witness requirement under Section 21, which now only requires an elected public official and either a representative of the National Prosecution Service or of the media. These witnesses must be present not only during inventory, but more important, during the seizure and confiscation of the illegal drugs.

 

In addition, the prosecution must establish every link in the chain of custody.

 

Here, the prosecution failed on both counts. Only a general acknowledgement of noncompliance with Section 21 was made, without identifying the specific measures undertaken to ensure the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. Worse, the prosecution attempted to shift the burden to accused-appellant to allege or prove contamination of the seized illegal drugs.

 

The two required witnesses were not present during the confiscation of the illegal drugs, tainting both the seizure and marking of the illegal drugs. The Search Warrant was issued on October 14, 2016 but was implemented three days later. Thus, the police officers had sufficient time to ensure that both witnesses would be present during the search. The prosecution did not attempt to explain why the search was commenced without waiting for Toledo. It also appears that Toledo was only contacted while the search was already ongoing. This taints the credibility of the corpus delicti at the time of seizure.

 

Second, the law and jurisprudence are clear that the marking, inventory, and photographing of the seized drugs "shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served." The prosecution failed to explain why the marking of seized items was done "outside the house."

Criminal Procedure Book Available Here

Republic of the Philippines vs. Clemente Tapay and Alberto T. Barrion, as the legal representative of the heirs of the deceased Floral Tapay, G.R. No. 157719, March 2, 2022

 

Republic of the Philippines vs. Clemente Tapay and Alberto T. Barrion, as the legal representative of the heirs of the deceased Floral Tapay, 

G.R. No. 157719, March 2, 2022

 

Facts:

1.     Sometime in 1980, Flora and Clemente Tapay filed an application for registration of Lot No. 10786 before the RTC of Lipa City. They alleged that a certain Francisca Cueto had been in possession of the property since 1925 until it was sold to Teofila Lindog, respondents' predecessor. When Teofila died intestate in 1971, respondents inherited the property.

2.     Respondents' application for registration was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General.

3.     During the course of the proceedings, the Land Registration Commission or LRC (now the Land Registration Authority or LRA) issued a report stating that based on the Books of Cadastral Lots, the lot was previously the subject of registration in another case-Cadastral Case No. 33 and had already been adjudicated to another person, but the cadastral court has yet to issue a decree of registration. 

4.     The LRC, however, was unable to determine the identity of the person to whom the property was adjudicated to because the records of the case, including a copy of the decision, were not available

5.     Despite the report of the LRC, the RTC adjudicated the land to the respondents.

6.     After the Decision became final, the RTC directed the LRC to issue the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title. However, instead of complying with the order, the LRC submitted a supplemental report reiterating that the subject land was previously the subject of registration proceedings in Cadastral Case No. 33. The LRC then recommended that the cadastral court's decision be nullified so that it can issue a decree of registration in favor of respondents.

7.     Accordingly, respondents filed a motion to set aside the decision in Cadastral Case No. 33 in order to give effect to the Decision of the RTC. This motion was granted by the RTC.

 

Issue:

Whether or not RTC can set aside the decision of the cadastral court

 

Ruling:

 

Yes. The Supreme Court agrees with petitioner that a regional trial court has no power to nullify or interfere with the decision of a co-equal court pursuant to the law and the doctrine of judicial stability. Applying the doctrine to this case, petitioner is correct in postulating that the Order of RTC Lipa City is void and thus, the cadastral court's decision in Cadastral Case No. 33 remains valid and subsisting as of this time.

 

However, the foregoing presupposes that Cadastral Case No. 33 really existed and that there actually is a decision in that case. Unfortunately for petitioner, aside from the single entry "Cadastral Case No. 33, LRC (GLRO) Cadastral Record No. 1305," no other record, including a copy of the decision, exists to support the theory.

 

Key information, such as the identity of the parties in the case and of the court that rendered the decision, as well as the outcome thereof, has remained unknown despite the lapse of more than 40 years since the LRC submitted its report. No one, aside from the Republic, has even come forward to claim any interest arising from the supposed case. The Court therefore agrees with the CA that the doctrine of judicial stability finds no application in this case. Practical considerations now demand that the proceedings in the RTC be no longer disturbed and the RTC Order no longer set aside.

In Re: Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession, Philippine National Bank vs. Alma T. Placencia Fontanoza, G.R. No. 213673

 

In Re: Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession, Philippine National Bank vs. Alma T. Placencia Fontanoza, 

G.R. No. 213673

 

Facts:

1.     Spouses Salvador and Alma Fontanoza obtained a loan from the Ozamiz Branch of the Philippine National Bank. To secure the loan, they mortgaged a parcel of land.

2.     Since the Fontanozas failed to pay, PNB foreclosed the property. 

3.     As the sole bidder in the public auction, PNB acquired the lot.

4.     PNB registered the sale. However, the Fontanozas failed to redeem the property.

5.     More than nine years later, PNB filed an exparte petition for issuance of writ of possession before the RTC.

6.     The RTC granted PNB's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.

7.     More than two months after the RTC's Resolution became final and executory, Alma filed an opposition with urgent motion to recall writ of possession. 

8.     She averred that she also instituted a suit against PNB before the trial court which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-20-458. Likewise, she had a contract with PNB for the repurchase of the property, and that she had already paid the agreed down payment, which she claimed as earnest money. In addition, she was not notified of PNB's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession

 

Issue:

Whether or not the Alma can recall the writ of possession.

 

Ruling:

 

No. The Supreme Court held that "once title to the property has been consolidated in the buyer's name upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right belonging to the buyer. Consequently, the buyer can demand possession of the property at any time. Its right of possession has then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute owner and the issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial function that does not admit of the exercise of the court's discretion. The court, acting on an application for its issuance, should issue the writ as a matter of course and without any delay.

 

Alma failed to redeem the property during the one-year redemption period. Thus, she ceased to have rights over the subject lot either as a mortgagor or redemptioner. 

 

However, there are exceptions to the rule that the trial court's duty to issue the writ of possession in favor of the purchaser is ministerial. "In Nagtalon v. United Coconut Planters Bank, the Court enumerated the following jurisprudential exceptions: 

(a) gross inadequacy of the purchase price; 

(b) third party claiming right adverse to the mortgagor/debtor, and; 

(c) failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to the mortgagor. 

 

The first and third exceptions cannot apply to this case since there are no allegations referring to either the purchase price or surplus proceeds of the sale, if any.

 

A third party should hold possession of the subject property adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor. Although Alma is supposedly in possession of the property, she cannot be considered as a third party who held the property adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor simply because she herself was the mortgagor who failed to redeem the lot. This is notwithstanding PNB's delay, for reasons only known to it, in filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. Alma posits that since she filed a case "for the declaration of the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale as null and void or for repurchase," the RTC erroneously issued the writ of possession in PNB's favor. Yet, jurisprudence teaches that "not even any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure is a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of execution/writ of possession." Hence, she cannot insist on the recall of the writ of possession solely because she filed a separate case which questioned the foreclosure and advanced her claim of repurchase.

 

In the case at bench, the aforementioned exceptions are not present.

Harte-Hanks Philippines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 205189, March 7, 2022

 

Harte-Hanks Philippines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 

G.R. No. 205189, March 7, 2022

 

Facts:

1.     Harte-Hanks Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. 

2.     On March 23, 2010, petitioner filed a written application for refund or issuance of a tax credit for its excess and unutilized input value-added tax for the first to second quarters of 2008 with respondent CIR. The CIR did not act on the application.

3.     On June 29, 20l0, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA Second Division, praying for the refund or issuance of a tax credit representing excess input VAT attributable to zero-rated sales for the second quarter of 2008.

4.     On October 4, 2010, the CIR filed a supplemental answer, praying that the petition for review be dismissed for failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies, pursuant to Section 112 (C) of the 1997 Tax Code.

 

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, pursuant to Section 112 (C) of the 1997 Tax Code.

 

Ruling:

 

No. The Supreme Court held that Section 112 (D) [now Section 112 (C)] of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in support of the appli \cation [for tax refund/credit]," within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer's recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if end the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.

 

There is an exception to this general rule, however. BIR Ruling No. DA489-03, a general interpretative rule issued by the CIR pursuant to its power under Section 4 of the Tax Code, expressly states that the "taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of petition for review."

 

In other words, the 120+30-day period is generally mandatory and jurisdictional from the effectivity of the 1997 NIRC on 1 January 1998, up to the present. By way of an exception, judicial claims filed during the window period from 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010, need not wait for the exhaustion of the 120-day period.

 

Even if petitioner seemed to have prematurely filed its judicial claim under the general rule, the Court, pursuant to BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, considers petitioner to have filed its judicial claim on time.

 

As a final note, the Court emphasizes that, although petitioner did not actually invoke BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 in any of its pleadings to justify the timeliness of its judicial claim with the CTA, the BIR Ruling applies to all taxpayers who filed their judicial claims within the window period of December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. To limit the application of the BIR Ruling only to those who invoked it specifically would unduly strain the pronouncements in San Roque, Taganito and Philex.

Elizabeth Brual vs. Jorge Brual Contreras, et. Al., G.R. No. 205451, March 7, 2022

 

Elizabeth Brual vs. Jorge Brual Contreras, et. Al., 

G.R. No. 205451, March 7, 2022

 

Facts:

1.     Fausta Brual remained single during her lifetime and was under the care of her nephew, Ireneo Brual, and his wife Elizabeth Brual.

2.     Elizabeth, as instituted heir and co-executor, filed before the RTC a petition for probate of the last will and testament of the late Fausta.

3.     However, respondents, as nephews and nieces of Fausta, filed a manifestation and motion for intervention and supplemental allegations (in support of the manifestation and motion to intervene) before the probate court.

4.     The RTC issued an Order/Resolution denying the respondents' motion for intervention and supplemental allegation. 

5.     The RTC held that Fausta, who died single and without compulsory heirs, may dispose of her entire estate by. Hence, the RTC did not find any compelling reason to grant the motion for intervention

6.     Respondents then filed their motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC.

7.     Hence, the respondents filed their notice of appeal. 

8.     The RTC issued an Order dismissing respondents' appeal due to their failure to file a record on appeal pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

9.     Undaunted, respondents filed their omnibus motion for reconsideration and admit records on appeal. It was their belief that the submission of a record on appeal would only come after the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of docket fees. 

10.  The RTC ultimately denied respondents' omnibus motion

11.  Undeterred by the ruling of the RTC, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying their appeal

12.  The CA granted respondents' petition and reversed and set aside the RTC's dismissal of respondents' appeal. It held that an appeal must not be dismissed based on mere procedural technicalities.

13.  Elizabeth filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. Hence, this instant petition.

 

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC is correct in dismissing respondents’ appeal due to failure to file a record on appeal.

 

Ruling:

 

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 

 

Under Section 2 of Rule 41, it states that: x x x No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where law on these Rules so require.

 

On the other hand, under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within which to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse party.

 

The rules are clear. While it is not necessary that a notice of appeal and a record on appeal be filed simultaneously, the rule is unequivocal that the notice of appeal and record of appeal shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order.

 

The period for appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from receipt of the notice of the final order dismissing the motion for intervention, or from November 15, 2010, the date respondents' counsel received the order of denial. Respondents had until December 15, 2010 within which to file their notice and record on appeal. Since they filed their motion for reconsideration on November 26, 2010, the period for filing of the appeal was duly interrupted. When respondents however received the final order denying their motion for reconsideration on January 24, 2011, the period to appeal, applying the fresh period rule, resumed and they had 30 days thereafter or until February 23, 2011 to perfect their appeal in accordance with the rules. Verily, respondents filed their notice of appeal on February 3, 2011 without a record on appeal. Thus, on April 27, 2011, the RTC dismissed the notice of appeal due to its non-perfection and failure to file the required record on appeal. It was only on June 27, 2011 that respondents filed their omnibus motion for reconsideration with motion to admit record on appeal while claiming inadve1ience and lack of knowledge on the timing of the filing of the record on appeal.