Isabelo Cabalhin vs. Sps. Bonifacio Lansuela and Isidra Lansuela,
G.R. No. 202029, February 15, 2022
Facts:
1. The present controversy involves a parcel of agricultural land. Said property is registered in the name of Isidoro Cabalhin under OCT No. P-21334 issued on September 3, 1958. Isidoro passed away in 1974.
2. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Preliminary and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the spouses Bonifacio Lansuela and Isidra Lansuela of the said property.
3. Respondents averred that since May 1988, they had been in peaceful possession of the subject land on which they planted rice and other agricultural products.
4. They narrated that the said property was already sold by Isidoro to Enrique Perales under a Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1968.
5. The heirs of Perales sold the same to Teodoro Estorion by virtue of a Deed of Extra judicial Partition with Simultaneous Sale dated August 31, 1973. Under a Deed of Sale12 dated January 24, 1979, Estorion sold the property to Segros Manaay who, in turn, sold it to Bonifacio under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 9, 1988.
6. Despite these sales, OCT No. P-21334 is still in the possession of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents validly acquired ownership of the parcel of land.
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Ruling:
No. Under the Civil Code, the "ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof."
While a contract of sale is perfected by mere consent, ownership of the thing sold is acquired only upon its delivery to the buyer. Upon the perfection of the sale, the seller assumes the obligation to transfer ownership and to deliver the thing sold, but the real right of ownership is transferred only "by tradition" or delivery thereof to the buyer.
In this case, the ownership of the disputed land was not validly transferred to respondents by virtue of the deed of absolute sale executed by Manaay because the latter is not in possession of either the land or the title. Respondents, as vendees, were not placed in possession and control of the land they bought simply because Manaay did not have such possession. In other words, Manaay could not have effected a constructive delivery of the land to respondents by his execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 9, 1988.
There being no actual or constructive delivery of the land subject of the sale between Manaay and respondents, the latter did not acquire its ownership.
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