Jessica P. Maitim a.k.a. "Jean Garcia" vs. Maria Theresa P. Aguila,
G.R. No. 218344, March 21, 2022
Facts:
1. Petitioner Jessica Maitim and respondent Maria Theresa P. Aguila were residents of Grand Pacific Manor Townhouse. Their respective townhouse units are approximately nine meters apart, separated only by a driveway jointly used by the townhouse unit owners.
2. Maitim was on board her vehicle, registered under her name, which was being driven by Restituto Santos. While they were driving along the common driveway, Angela Aserehet P. Aguila , the six-year old daughter of Aguila, was sideswiped by Maitim's vehicle. Angela was dragged for about three meters resulting to her right leg being fractured.
3. Maitim and Santos did not immediately take Angela to the hospital after the incident; she was only brought to St. Luke's Medical Center after the insistence of Angela's grandmother, Lirio Aguila.
4. Angela was diagnosed to have suffered swelling, hematoma, multiple abrasions, and displaced, complete fracture on the right leg.
5. Thus, she underwent operation at Asian Hospital and was in a wheelchair for more than 2 months.
6. Aguila filed the instant action for damages based on quasi-delict before the RTC.
Issues:
· Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the instant case.
· Whether or not Maitim is solidarily liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability.
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Ruling:
FIRST ISSUE
Yes. In UPCB General Insurance Co. v. Pascual Liner, Inc., the Supreme Court reiterated the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in vehicular accidents, wherein it is sufficient that the accident itself be established, and once established through the admission of evidence, whether hearsay or not, the rule on res ipsa loquitur already starts to apply.
As applied in the instant case, the fact that Angela was hit by a moving vehicle owned by Maitim and driven by Santos is undisputed, and the same is supported by the Traffic Accident Investigation Report.
The fact that Angela sustained injuries in her collision with Maitim's vehicle is also not in question. Thus, since it is clearly established that there was a vehicular accident that caused injuries, then the rule on res ipsa loquitur shall apply. An inference of negligence on the part of Santos, the person who controls the instrumentality (vehicle) causing the injury, arises, and he has the burden of presenting proof to the contrary.
Ordinarily, driving inside a relatively narrow driveway shared by two houses would not result to children being hit and their bones fractured. This is because a reasonably prudent man, especially an alleged experienced driver, would have foreseen that the residents of the houses may exit towards the common driveway anytime, including young and playful children who may suddenly run across or along said driveway. Thus, a reasonably prudent man is expected to drive with utmost caution when traversing the said driveway, even if given a "clear" signal by a guard.
In fact, Maitim herself admits that there is a natural tendency to drive at a slow speed when in a narrow driveway. However, her allegation that Santos was driving at a slow speed, which is admittedly "natural," contradicts the circumstances surrounding Angela's injury. If Santos truly drove slowly and with care, he should have been able to have ample opportunity to brake or otherwise steer the vehicle out of trouble, both of which did not happen in this case.
Moreover, even if a running child were to get hit by a slow-moving vehicle, it is highly unlikely that the same would result to injuries so severe that it required surgery and afterwards being confined to a wheelchair for more than two months.
In sum, there is nothing natural about a child getting dragged for three meters and her leg being completely fractured by a slow-moving vehicle, especially if a reasonably prudent man was driving the vehicle with care. Thus, both the RTC and CA were right in finding negligence on the part of Santos.
SECOND ISSUE
The Supreme Court held that Maitim failed to prove that she was not vicariously liable in this case.
Jurisprudence has established that under Article 2180, "when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both." "The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee."
Applying these concepts to the present case, the finding of negligence against Santos gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of Maitim in the latter's selection and/or supervision of the former. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Maitim to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employee, Santos. In her petition, Maitim stubbornly insists that she cannot be held vicariously liable because she alleges that Santos has an unblemished 12-year driving record, and that before Santos was hired, he was required to submit a police clearance and an NBI clearance. However, she presented no evidence to corroborate or support her bare, self-serving allegations. The Supreme Court has constantly held that bare allegations cannot be considered as proof, especially when, such as in this case, the records are barren of any evidence that would support such allegations.
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